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Abstract 
Not all pieces of information mentioned during an interaction are equally accessible in 
speakers’ conversational memory. The current study sought to test whether two basic features 
of dialogue management (reference acceptance and reuse) affect reference recognition. Dyads 
of speakers were asked to discuss a route for an imaginary person, thus referring to the 
landmarks to be encountered. The results revealed that the participants’ conversational 
memory for the references produced during the interaction depended on whether these had 
been reused during the interaction and by whom, along with landmark visibility during the 
interaction. These findings have implications for partner adaptation in dialogue, which 
depends in part on what speakers remember of past interactions. 
 
Keywords: dialogue; referential communication; information accessibility; conversational 
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The influence of reference acceptance and reuse on conversational memory traces 
 
During dialogue, speakers often need to refer to what was said previously to produce and to 
interpret utterances correctly, raising the question of the nature of the memory traces left by 
past interactions. The link between dialogue and memory has been highlighted in studies on 
conversational memory. Some of the determinants of this kind of memory, such as 
interactional content (i.e., whether or not an utterance contains information about the 
speakers’ intentions and attitudes towards the addressee; Keenan, MacWhinney, & Mayhew, 
1977; MacWhinney, Keenan, & Reinke, 1982) or presence of sarcasm (Gibbs, 1986) pertain 
to the features of the utterances produced during the interaction; others, such as speaker 
gender (Baroni & Nicolini, 1995), addressee distractibility (Pasupathi & Hoyt, 2010), partner 
status (e.g., interacting with a coworker vs. interacting with one’s boss; Holtgraves, Srull, & 
Socall, 1989), partner familiarity (Samp & Humphreys, 2007) or active vs. passive 
participation in the interaction (e.g., Baroni, D’Urso, & Pascotto, 1991) pertain to the features 
of the speakers engaged in the interaction. Conversational memory also depends on the 
episodic cues created at the time of initial encoding (Horton, 2008; Horton & Gerrig, 2005).  
 The fact that all pieces of information mentioned during an interaction are not equally 
likely to be remembered could have important consequences for the collaborative approach to 
dialogue (Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Indeed, one of 
the central ideas in this approach is that any piece of information mentioned during an 
interaction is added to the speakers’ common ground, which consists of the information that 
they share and are aware of sharing (Clark, 1996). Specifically, these pieces of information 
are added to the common ground through a joint contribution process (Clark & Schaefer, 
1989). One of the speakers starts by presenting a piece of information (e.g., a reference) for 
the other speaker to understand; the latter then accepts it by showing that he or she has 
understood it well enough for current purposes (Clark & Brennan, 1991). A speaker might 
accept a piece of information by repeating it verbatim (in which case the information would 
be accepted explicitly), but he or she might also accept it by simply initiating the next relevant 
speech turn (in which case the information would be accepted implicitly). Accepted 
information can then be reused by the partners during the remainder of the interaction 
(Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012). Presentation, acceptance and reuse constitute the three steps of 
dialogue management. What’s more, information from the common ground can be reused 
during subsequent interactions between the same two speakers, as common ground is partner-
specific (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). Thus, part of Speaker A and 
Speaker B’s common ground is based on the content of past interactions between these two 
speakers, which implies that they are capable of remembering what was said then. 
 As stated above, a number of determinants of conversational memory have already 
been identified, yet very little is known regarding how more basic features of dialogue 
management might affect conversational memory for the references produced during an 
interaction. For instance, the way in which a piece of information is accepted might affect its 
subsequent accessibility in memory. Specifically, the fact that pieces of information accepted 
through verbatim repetition are produced twice at the time of initial contribution could 
strengthen the traces they leave in the speakers’ memory. However, differences at the time of 
acceptance might not be sufficient to account for the differences in accessibility of the pieces 
of information mentioned during an interaction. Indeed, accepted references can be reused 
between the moment when they were accepted and the end of the interaction (Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2012); such reuse could reinforce information accessibility in memory. Since both self- 
and partner-produced words tend to be remembered better than non-produced words (such as, 
for instance, words read silently; what’s more, this production benefit is enhanced when the 
production is self-performed; MacLeod, 2011), this should hold for both self-reused 
references (as opposed to references which were not reused by oneself) and for partner-reused 
references (as opposed to references which were not reused by the partner). What’s more, this 
might hold regardless of how information was initially accepted (i.e., explicitly or non-
explicitly). Thus, reuse might have a greater influence than acceptance on conversational 
memory for the references produced during an interaction.  
 The purpose of the current study is to determine whether the strength of the memory 
traces left by past interactions depends on how references were accepted or on whether these 
references were reused (and by whom). A recognition test was used to assess participants’ 
memory for the references mentioned during an interactive route description task. Two 
hypotheses were tested. First, the Acceptance Hypothesis was that references accepted 
through verbatim repetition are recognized better than references accepted through other 
means. Second, the Reuse Hypothesis was that references reused during the interaction (either 
by oneself or by the other person) are recognized better than non-reused ones. 
 
Method 
Overview of the experiment and rationale 
In an experiment, dyads of participants interacted to perform a route description task. Each 
participant was given a map in order to do this; they both referred to the landmarks shown on 
the maps as they interacted. Although the maps represented the same area, only part of the 
landmarks were shown on both maps; others were only shown on one of the maps. Thus, from 
each participant’s point of view, this experiment involved referring to privileged-to-self 
landmarks (which were only shown on one’s own map), to shared landmarks (which were 
shown on both maps) and to privileged-to-other landmarks (which were only shown on one’s 
partner’s map). The purpose of this was to manipulate referent visibility from each 
participant’s point of view, thus allowing us to determine whether the influence of acceptance 
and/or reuse on reference recognition depended on whether the corresponding referents were 
visible or not during the interaction (see Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012, for a similar method). At 
the end of the interaction, the participants performed an individual recognition test during 
which they were asked to identify the references mentioned during the interaction.  
 
Participants 
Twenty-eight dyads of native French speakers (18-25 years, 11 male) signed an informed 
consent form before taking part in the experiment for course credit. 
 
Apparatus 
The participants were recorded using two microphones connected to a digital recorder. 
 
Materials 
A map including 90 landmarks (24 buildings, nine squares and 57 street names) was used to 
build the stimuli used in this experiment. The 90 landmarks were randomly divided into three 
blocks (B1, B2 and B3), each including eight buildings, three squares and 19 street names. 
Three maps were then created, each including two blocks of landmarks. Within each dyad, 
each participant was given a different map (see Figure 1). For instance, Participant A would 
be given map B1B2 and Participant B would be given map B2B3; thus, B1 landmarks would 
be privileged to A (i.e., privileged-to-self from A’s point of view and privileged-to-other from 
B’s point of view), B2 landmarks would be shared and B3 landmarks would be privileged to 
B (i.e., privileged-to-other from A’s point of view and privileged-to-self from B’s point of 
view). Block distribution within dyads was counterbalanced across dyads. 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 Paper booklets were prepared for each participant to use during the recognition test. 
Each booklet included all landmarks shown on at least one of the two maps (i.e., the three 
blocks of target landmarks), regardless of whether or not these had actually been mentioned 
during the interaction. The landmark labels were identical to those shown on the maps during 
the dialogue phase (e.g., “hôpital” (“hospital”), “place Laganne” (“Laganne Square”), “rue 
Jean Jaurès” (“Jean Jaurès Street”)). It also included an additional block of 30 new landmarks 
(eight buildings, three squares and 19 street names) which were not shown on the maps used 
during the dialogue phase and which served as distractors (the purpose of these was to 
increase the difficulty of the recognition test). The status of these new landmarks was not 
rotated across participants or dyads (i.e., these 30 landmarks were always new to both 
participants). Thus, from each participant’s point of view, the booklet included 25% of 
entirely new landmarks, 25% of privileged-to-other landmarks which could potentially have 
been mentioned during the dialogue phase, but which were not shown on one’s own map 
(note that in cases where these had not been mentioned, these landmark names were in fact 
“new” to the participant) and 50% of shared and privileged-to-self landmarks which could 
potentially have been mentioned during the dialogue phase and which were shown on one’s 
own map. The booklets were divided into three subsections (buildings, squares and street 
names); subsection presentation order was counterbalanced across dyads. Landmark names 
were listed in alphabetical order in each subsection. In front of each landmark name, a box 
could be ticked if the participant believed that it had been mentioned during the interaction.  
 
Task and procedure 
The participants performed the experiment in pairs. They sat in the experimental room, each 
facing a different wall of the room, so that they could not see each other. The purpose of this 
was to prevent them from using non-linguistic cues such as facial expressions to communicate 
during the experiment. 
 The participants’ task consisted in discussing a route for a person who had no previous 
knowledge of the town represented on the maps. They knew that the landmarks differed 
across maps, but they did not know which were shared and which were not. They were told 
that all landmarks could be included in the route, even those which were not shown on both 
maps. They were informed that they would have to write out individually (using a pen and 
paper) the route chosen after the end of the interaction (this was to force them to pay attention 
to what was being said during the interaction), but they did not know in advance that they 
would have to perform a recognition test. 
 During the first phase of the experiment (dialogue phase), the participants had a 
maximum of 15 minutes to agree on a return tourist route between Point A and Point B, which 
were shown on both maps. The participants performed the second phase of the experiment 
(recognition test phase) immediately after the dialogue phase. During this phase, the 
participants were each given a booklet and a pen and were asked to identify which landmarks 
had been mentioned during the interaction. The participants performed this part of the 
experiment at their own pace (there was no time limit) and could go back and change their 
responses if necessary. They could not communicate nor have access to the maps during this 
phase. 
 
Data coding and experimental design 
The dialogues between the participants were transcribed; the references produced by the 
participants were coded for presentation, acceptance and reuse (see Appendix A).  
 Four IVs were used: Landmark Status (Privileged-to-self, Privileged-to-other; Shared), 
Acceptance Type (Verbatim, Anaphoric, Non-explicit), Reuse by Self (Reused by self, Non-
reused by self) and Reuse by Other (Reused by other, Non-reused by other). The basic 
analysis unit was always the participant rather than the dyad.  
 
Results 
A total of 1042 references were presented during the dialogue phase (each speaker presented 
18.61 (SD = 5.12) references on average). Among these, 416 were shared and 626 were 
privileged to one of the speakers. Regarding acceptance, 222 references were accepted 
through verbatim repetition, 664 were accepted anaphorically and the remaining 156 were 
accepted non-explicitly. 
 The participants reused a total of 938 references during the dialogue phase. (Recall 
that a reference could be reused by more than one speaker; 938 references being reused does 
not necessarily mean that almost all presented references were reused, as some might have 
been reused by two participants in a dyad: this would have counted as two separate reuses). 
Among these, 473 were shared, 339 were privileged-to-self and 126 were privileged-to-other. 
Regarding acceptance, 217 references had been accepted through verbatim repetition, 605 had 
been accepted anaphorically and the remaining 116 had been accepted non-explicitly. 
 Before performing the statistical analysis per se, we examined the participants’ overall 
performance in the recognition test. The participants’ capacity to reject the references which 
had not been mentioned during the dialogue phase was examined first. Regarding the 
references to landmarks which were actually shown on at least one of the maps during the 
dialogue phase, Table 1 shows that the false alarm rate was fairly low (i.e., it varied between 
2.09% and 5.31%). Regarding the references to new, distractor landmarks, the false alarm rate 
was even lower (i.e., 1.37%). This false alarm rate could not be used to estimate the 
participants’ overall tendency to say that a landmark had been mentioned, as the status of 
these landmarks was not counterbalanced across participants or dyads (i.e., the same 30 
landmarks were always new to the participants; something about these landmarks might have 
made them easier to reject than the other landmarks). However, privileged-to-other landmarks 
which were never mentioned during the interaction were entirely new to one of the 
participants in the dyad during the recognition test; since the status of these landmarks was 
counterbalanced across participants and dyads, the false alarm rate for these landmarks could 
be used as a baseline in this experiment. The results revealed that 2.13% of these were 
mistakenly identified as having been mentioned during the dialogue phase (precisely, a total 
of 1054 privileged-to-other landmarks were never referred to during the dialogue phase; 
among these, 22 were mistakenly identified as having been mentioned). This suggests that the 
overall false alarm rate was fairly low in this experiment. 
Second, we looked at whether the participants were capable of correctly identifying 
the references which had been mentioned during the dialogue phase. The participants’ 
responses were correct 63.05% of the time. This could mean two different things: it could 
mean either that the participants had a bias toward answering “no” to the landmark names in 
the list, or that answering “yes” to landmark names which had actually been mentioned during 
the interaction was somewhat more difficult than rejecting unmentioned references. In any 
event, the results suggest that the participants’ capacity to correctly recognize these references 
depended on reference status: the statistical analysis reported hereafter was conducted to 
investigate these differences further.  
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
 A logistic mixed model was used to analyze the data. Such models can be used to 
account for the nesting of participants in groups in cases where the outcome variable is binary 
(see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Jaeger, 2008). This analysis was conducted using 
the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.4. More detail about the random effects structure used can 
be found in Appendix B. As the number of observations varied across participants, the 
Satterthwaite correction was applied (Keselman, Algina, Kowalchuk, & Wolfinger, 1999). 
Only the data corresponding to the references which had actually been presented during the 
interaction were analyzed. 
 The binary dependent variable was whether a reference received a “mentioned” 
judgment (which would represent a correct response) or an “unmentioned” judgment (which 
would represent an incorrect response). Main effects were systematically included in the 
models; interactions were only included if they reached statistical significance. Accordingly, 
the model included Landmark Status, Acceptance Type, Reuse by Self, Reuse by Other and 
the interaction between Reuse by Self and Reuse by Other as fixed effects. By-participant and 
by-item random intercepts and by-participant random slopes corresponding to Acceptance 
Type and Reuse by Other were included. The results are reported in Table 2; the tests of fixed 
effects and the model parameters are reported in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
 Landmark Status, Reuse by Self, Reuse by Other and the interaction between Reuse by 
Self and Reuse by Other significantly predicted reference recognition (Table 3). In contrast, 
Acceptance Type failed to reach statistical significance, even though one of the corresponding 
parameter estimates comparison yielded a significant difference in the baseline modalities of 
the other factors (i.e., verbatim vs. non-explicit). 
 Regarding Landmark Status, references to privileged-to-other landmarks were 
significantly less likely to be recognized than references to shared landmarks, OR = .49, CI.95 
= .38, .64; in contrast, references to privileged-to-self landmarks were significantly more 
likely to be recognized than references to shared landmarks, OR = 1.38, CI.95 = 1.05, 1.81. 
These results show that referent visibility during the dialogue phase affected the subsequent 
accessibility in memory of the corresponding references. Indeed, references to landmarks 
which were visible to the participants during the dialogue phase (privileged-to-self and 
shared) were recognized better than references to landmarks which were not visible during the 
dialogue phase (privileged-to-other). This extends Knutsen and Le Bigot’s (2012) finding that 
referent visibility affects reference reuse: it also has a longer-term influence on the speakers’ 
conversational memory for the references produced during the interaction. Moreover, the 
results suggest that references to privileged-to-self landmarks were recognized better than 
references to shared landmarks. One possible explanation is that references to privileged-to-
self landmarks tend to be reused more often than references to shared landmarks, thus 
reinforcing the corresponding memory traces. 
 What’s more, two main effects corresponding to Reuse by Self and Reuse by Other 
were found. As predicted, self-reused references were recognized better than non-self-reused 
ones, and partner-reused references were recognized better than non-partner-reused ones, 
respectively OR = 2.61, CI.95 = 2.05, 3.33 and OR = 2.64, CI.95 = 2.00, 3.48. Furthermore, a 
significant interaction between Reuse by self and Reuse by other was found (see Figure 2). 
This interaction revealed that the participants’ tendency to recognize better the references 
which had been reused by their partner than the references which had not been reused by their 
partner was smaller in cases where they had also reused these references themselves 
(compared with cases where they had not reused these references themselves), OR = 0.44. 
Consequently, the references which had been reused by both participants were recognized 
better than the other references (i.e., the references which had been reused by one participant 
only and the references which had never been reused); the references which had been reused 
by neither participant were recognized less well than the other references (i.e., the references 
which had been reused by both participants and the references which had been reused by one 
participant only).  
 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
 
 Finally, in this model, the influence of Acceptance Type failed to reach statistical 
significance. This lack of a significant difference does not necessarily mean that Acceptance 
Type does not affect conversational memory for the references produced during the 
interaction; however, it does suggest that its influence is minimized when reuse (along with 
referent visibility) is taken into account, in line with the Reuse Hypothesis. 
 
Discussion 
This study sought to determine how acceptance and reuse shape speakers’ conversational 
memory for the references produced during an interaction. The statistical analysis performed 
showed no significant evidence that the references accepted through verbatim repetition were 
recognized better than the references accepted through other means, thus suggesting that reuse 
had a stronger influence than acceptance on the participants’ performance in the recognition 
test. Specifically, the accessibility in memory of self-reused references was greater than that 
of non-self-reused references; the accessibility of the latter could then be enhanced through 
partner reuse. In addition, partner-reused references were also more readily accessible than 
non-partner-reused ones. These results imply that it is the reuse that speakers make of 
references, rather than the way in which these were accepted, that shapes conversational 
memory for references produced during an interaction. This is in line not only with the Reuse 
Hypothesis, but also with MacLeod’s (2011) finding that word accessibility in memory is 
enhanced by both self- and partner-production. The lack of a significant interaction between 
Landmark Status and the other IVs prevents us from concluding that the influence of reuse on 
conversational memory for the references produced during an interaction depends on referent 
visibility, although references to non-visible referents tend to leave weaker memory traces 
than references to visible ones. 
 These findings raise the question of the nature of the memory representations 
examined in this study. One possibility is that episodes corresponding to reference reuse are 
encoded separately from episodes corresponding to presentation and acceptance (even though 
these might concern the same references), as both episodes are separated by several speech 
turns. The availability of two different episodes (rather than just one) might increase the 
accessibility in memory of the corresponding reference, which could help explain why reused 
references were recognized better than non-reused ones in this study. This could also help 
explain why the references reused by both participants were recognized better than the 
references reused by one participant only. Reuse by self and reuse by other might also be 
encoded separately, thus again increasing the number of episodes associated with the 
references reused by the two dialogue partners. However, an alternative explanation is that the 
same reuse memory episode is reinforced through repeated reuse by both partners. Of course, 
these propositions are only provisional, as they could not be tested directly in this study; 
future work should be directed towards addressing the possibilities developed here. For 
instance, whether reuse by self and reuse by other are encoded separately might depend on the 
number of speech turns occurring between them. 
 In any event, these results shed light on the role of self- and partner-production in 
conversational memory, as the evidence on this point is somewhat mixed (see Hjelmquist, 
1984; Jarvella & Collas, 1974, who showed that self-produced information is remembered 
better than partner-produced information; see also Stafford, Burggraf, & Sharkey, 1987; 
Stafford & Daly, 1984, who reported the contrary). Specifically, they show that both self- and 
partner-production contribute to shaping conversational memory for the references produced 
during an interaction, as partner-production reinforces the accessibility in memory of 
information which did not benefit from the self-production benefit. Moreover, the fact that the 
references which had been reused by both partners were more readily accessible in memory 
than any other kind of reference suggests that individual and collective reuse have a different 
influence on conversational memory. These findings corroborate the idea that “retelling” (that 
is, having the opportunity to mention an encoded piece of information again between the 
moment when it was initially encoded and the moment when memory is assessed) can affect 
the accessibility in memory of previously encoded information (see Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; 
Marsh, 2007), as reference accessibility in memory depended less on reference initial 
encoding (i.e., presentation and acceptance) and more on what happened between initial 
encoding and the recognition test (i.e., reuse) in this study. Moreover, the current results 
reveal that the influence of retelling during dialogue on information accessibility depends on 
whether the retelling is performed by one speaker alone, or by both speakers together. These 
findings are also in line with the more general idea that collaboration has an influence on 
memory performance (Andersson & Rönnberg, 1997; Barber, Rajaram, & Aron, 2010; 
Rajaram, 2011).  
 The findings reported here have important implications for the collaborative approach 
to dialogue (e.g., Clark, 1996), as this approach states that the content of past interactions can 
be used in subsequent interactions between the same dialogue partners. Indeed, speakers can 
resort to their conversational memory for references produced during past interactions to 
assess common ground and to produce partner-adapted utterances, reasoning that a reference 
which was successfully understood earlier during the current interaction or during past 
interactions should be understood again (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981). 
The current study sheds light on the memory traces available to each speaker to do so, 
suggesting that the strength of such traces depends on whether these were reused and by 
whom during the initial interaction. We thus suggest that in contrast to the common ground 
based on the information mentioned earlier during the current interaction, which is built in 
two steps (presentation and acceptance; Clark & Schaefer, 1989), the common ground based 
on the content of past interactions is built in three phases: presentation, acceptance and reuse. 
Individual reuse (i.e., reuse by one speaker only) is sufficient to make references more readily 
accessible than if they had only been presented and accepted. Indeed, when Speaker A reuses 
a reference, it becomes readily accessible not only to A (by virtue of self-reuse), but also to B 
(by virtue of partner-reuse). However, collective reuse has an even greater influence on both 
speakers’ conversational memory.  
 In conclusion, the current study supports the idea that conversational memory mainly 
depends on whether a reference was reused and by whom during the interaction; it also 
depends on referent visibility. These findings shed light on the idea that self- and partner-
production jointly contribute to conversational memory; they also shed light on the nature of 
the memory traces available for speakers to use to assess common ground in subsequent 
interactions.  
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Appendix A: Dialogue example and coding sample 
First, references were coded for presentation: a reference was coded as presented when it was 
produced at least once in the dyad (e.g., ST01 in Table A1). Because no hypothesis was 
formulated concerning presentation, no analysis was performed including this variable. Each 
presented reference was then coded as accepted. The evidence produced by the participant 
who did not present the reference (i.e., the addressee at the time of presentation) between the 
moment when a reference was presented and the moment when the initiator of the reference 
produced another reference was used to code for acceptance type. If the presented reference 
was repeated by the addressee, it was coded as accepted through verbatim repetition (e.g., 
ST03). If the landmark mentioned was re-referred to using a pronoun or a zero anaphor, the 
reference was coded as accepted anaphorically (e.g., ST07). If the landmark mentioned was 
not re-referred to, the reference was coded as accepted non-explicitly (e.g., the reference 
“Saint George Square” in the example). Finally, occurrences of reference production which 
could not be counted as presentations or acceptances were coded as reuses (e.g., ST08); the 
only criterion was that reuse had to occur in a speech turn preceded by a minimum of two 
speech turns during which the reference was not produced (see ST10). Each reused reference 
was coded for reuse by self and for reused by other from each participant’s point of view (see 
Table A2). For instance, if a reference was reused by Partner A but not by Partner B, it was 
coded as reused by self and as non-reused by other from Partner A’s point of view, and as 
non-reused by self and as reused by other from Partner B’s point of view. An annotated 
dialogue extract can be found in Table A1; the purpose of Table A2 is to show how the 
different coding levels were represented in the datasheet used to perform the statistical 
analyses. 
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Table A1 
Annotated dialogue extract. 
Speech 
turn 
Dyad Speaker 
Utterance content (English 
Translation) 
Comments Level of coding 
01 D01 A ok you start 
 
  
02 D01 B well what I suggest is that she goes 
to the museum 
 
A reference to the museum is produced for the 
first time. 
 
“the museum”  presented  
03 D01 A to the museum 
 
The participant who did not present the 
reference “the museum” repeats this reference 
before its initiator produces another reference. 
 
“the museum”  accepted 
through verbatim repetition 
04 D01 B so they walk down Jean Jaurès 
Alley and after that she takes Saint 
Antoine Street to go to the museum 
 
References to Jean Jaurès Alley and Saint 
Antoine Street are produced for the first time. 
The reference to the museum is not coded as 
reused, as it was produced in the previous 
speech turn. 
 
“Jean Jaurès Alley”  
presented 
“Saint Antoine Street”  
presented 
05 D01 A wait slow down slow down  
 
  
06 D01 B point A Jean Jaurès Alley continue 
there’s a street Saint Antoine can 
you see it 
 
The references to Jean Jaurès Alley and to Saint 
Antoine Street are not coded as reused, as they 
were mentioned in the second previous speech 
turn. 
 
 
07 D01 A yes right I can see it 
 
The participant who did not present the 
reference “Saint Antoine Street” uses a pronoun 
to re-refer to this landmark before its initiator 
produces another reference. 
“Saint Antoine Street”  
accepted anaphorically 
Conversational memory traces left by dialogue management 24 
 
08 D01 B and after that there’s the museum 
 
The reference to the museum is reused in a 
speech turn preceded by two speech turns in 
which it is not mentioned. 
 
“The museum”  reused 
09 D01 A at the bottom of Saint Antoine 
Street you mean 
 
The reference to Saint Antoine Street is reused 
in a speech turn preceded by two speech turns in 
which it is not mentioned. 
 
“Saint Antoine Street”  
reused 
10 D01 B yes there’s Saint George’s Square 
and there’s a museum yeah 
 
A reference to Saint George’s Square is 
produced for the first time. 
The reference to the museum is not coded as 
reused, as it was produced in the previous 
speech turn. 
 
“Saint George’s Square”  
presented 
11 D01 A hm on my map I have Wilson’s 
Square 
 
A reference to Wilson’s square is produced for 
the first time. 
 
“Wilson’s Square”  
presented 
12 D01 B hm alright 
 
A zero anaphor (“hm alright” in fact meaning 
“hm alright [you have Wilson’s Square]) is used 
to re-refer to a reference before its initiator 
produces another reference. 
 
“Wilson’s Square”  
accepted anaphorically 
 
Table A2 
Coding example. 
Dyad Speaker Reference Acceptance type Reuse in the dyad Reuse by self Reuse by other 
 
D01 
 
A 
 
Museum 
 
Verbatim repetition 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
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D01 B Museum Verbatim repetition Yes Yes No 
 
D01 
 
A 
 
Jean Jaurès Alley 
 
Non-explicit 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
D01 B Jean Jaurès Alley Non-explicit No No No 
 
D01 
 
A 
 
Saint Antoine Street 
 
Anaphoric 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
D01 B Saint Antoine Street Anaphoric Yes No Yes 
 
D01 
 
A 
 
Saint George’s Square 
 
Non-explicit 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
D01 B Saint George’s Square Non-explicit No No No 
 
D01 
 
A 
 
Wilson’s Square 
 
Anaphoric 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
D01 B Wilson’s Square Anaphoric No No No 
 
 
 
Conversational memory traces left by dialogue management 26 
Appendix B: Detail of the random effects structures used in the statistical analyses 
As specified in the main text, a logistic mixed model was used to analyze the data. One 
advantage of mixed models is that they allow considering both fixed effects (i.e., IVs) and 
random effects. There are two different kinds of random effects: random intercepts and 
random slopes. Random intercepts are used to account for potential variability across analysis 
units (e.g., participants, items). Random slopes are used to account for analysis units 
potentially differing in their sensitivity to the within-unit fixed effects. 
 Mixed models should include the maximal random effects structure justified by the 
experimental design (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). However, doing so might cause 
convergence problems; that is, the models might fail to find an appropriate solution within the 
specified number of iterations. Increasing the number of iterations does not always help 
solving such problems. Importantly, however, there are different kinds of convergence 
problems, one of which can be solved by adjusting the specified random effects structure. 
Specifically, this convergence problem concerns the G matrix and occurs when the variation 
associated with at least one of the random effects (intercept or slope) specified is either null or 
negative. For instance, if a researcher includes by-participant random intercepts in a mixed 
model but that the variation associated with participants is not statistically significant, doing 
so might cause the G matrix to fail to converge. In such cases, an appropriate solution consists 
in identifying the effect(s) causing the convergence problems and removing it or them from 
the model (Kiernan, Tao, & Gibbs, 2012). Doing so does not affect the output of the analysis. 
 In this study, the data were analyzed using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.4 using 
a variance components variance-covariance matrix. Because the data included a hierarchical 
structure (i.e., participants were nested in dyads), the initial model used included by-dyad, by-
participant and by-item (i.e., landmark) random intercepts. It also included by-participant 
random slopes corresponding to the IVs. However, this random effects structure caused G-
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matrix convergence problems, suggesting that at least one of the random effects did not 
significantly contribute to the model. We thus removed the random intercept and slopes 
causing the convergence failures; our main concern was to preserve the by-participant random 
intercepts, as the basic analysis unit was the participant, and the by-item random intercepts, as 
some landmarks might have been easier to remember than others (this also allowed 
controlling for potential primacy and recency effects). This led us to remove the by-dyad 
random intercepts, the by-participants random slopes corresponding to the Landmark Status 
and Reuse by Self IVs and the by-participant random slopes corresponding to the Reuse by 
Self * Reuse by Other interaction. Thus, the model reported in the main paper included by-
participant and by-item random intercepts and by-participant random slopes corresponding to 
Acceptance Type and Reuse by Other. Nonetheless, we hereafter report the covariance 
parameter estimates, the F values and the model parameters from the full random effects 
structure model to ensure transparency. Note that the pattern of results reported in the paper 
and the pattern of results reported below are identical. 
 
Table B1 
Covariance parameter estimates, tests of fixed effects and model parameters using the full 
random effects structure model 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Subject Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Dyad Intercept 0  
Participant Intercept 0.34 0.12 
Participant Landmark Status 0  
Participant Acceptance Type 0.02 0.07 
Participant Reuse by Self 0  
Participant Reuse by Other 0.08 0.08 
Participant Reuse by Self * Reuse by Other 0  
Item Intercept 0.51 0.13 
 
Tests of fixed effects 
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Effect Num DF Den DF F value p value 
Landmark Status 2 2076 25.96 < .001 
Acceptance Type 2 124 2.60 .079 
Reuse by self 1 2076 59.33 < .001 
Reuse by other 1 90.43 48.60 < .001 
R. by self * R. by other 1 2076 12.62 < .001 
 
Model parameters      
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t value p value 
Intercept -0.61 0.21 400 -2.84 .005 
Status: privileged-to-
other 
-0.72 0.14 2076 -5.26 < .001 
Status: privileged-to-self 0.32 0.14 2076 2.31 .021 
Status: shared 0     
Acc. Type: Anaphoric 0.24 0.16 137 1.48 .142 
Acc. Type: Verbatim 0.43 0.19 223 2.28 .024 
Acc. Type: Non-explicit 0     
Reuse by self: yes 1.37 0.15 2076 8.70 < .001 
Reuse by self: no 0     
Reuse by other: yes 1.38 0.16 166 8.40 < .001 
Reuse by other: no 0     
R. self: yes, R. other: yes -0.82 0.23 2076 -3.55 < .001 
R. self: yes, R. other: no 0     
R. self: no, R. other: yes 0     
R. self: no, R. other: no 0     
Note. Estimate values set to 0 correspond to the baselines used in the analysis. 
 
 
